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COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vol. 8, No. 21 August 22, 1970

Resources Conservation Program (RECON)

Secretary Laird Stresses Defense-wide Cost Conscious Campaign

Stressing that Fiscal Year 1971 will be an austere year by any standards, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said, "it is incumbent on all in Defense to be cost conscious."

In a July 28 memorandum to Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Director, Defense Supply Agency, Secretary Laird referred to the Department's Resources Conservation Program (RECON), outlined in DoD Instruction 7720.6, dated July 3, 1970.

RECON succeeds the Cost Reduction Program.

Regarding the new fiscal year, Mr. Laird noted that military outlays will be down to seven per cent of the gross national product and 34.6 per cent of the total Federal budget. "You would have

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DoD General Counsel Post To Mr. Buzhardt

Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt Jr.

Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt Jr. was sworn in Aug. 20 as General Counsel of the Department of Defense. He was nominated by President Nixon.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird administered the oath of office to Mr. Buzhardt.

At the time of his appointment, Mr. Buzhardt was serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration. He also served as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel from June 30, 1969, to June 30, 1970.

As General Counsel, he will be the chief legal officer of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Buzhardt graduated from the U.S. Military Academy with a Bachelor of Science degree in Military Engineering in 1946. He received an LL.B. degree from the University of South Carolina in 1952.

Mr. Buzhardt practiced law in McCormick, S.C., from 1952-1958. From 1958-1966, he served on the staff of Senator Strom Thurmond. He resumed private law practice in 1966 and maintained general practice until he joined the Department of Defense.

He served in the Army Air Corps from October 1942 through July 1943. From 1946 through 1950 he served in the Air Force as a first lieutenant.

USS Eisenhower Keel Laid

Attack Carrier Is An Important Element Of American Sea Power: Secretary Laird

"For the foreseeable future, the attack carrier will remain an indispensable element of American sea power," Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said at the keel laying of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower at Newport News, Va., Aug. 15.

He noted, "It is especially appropriate to honor President Eisenhower by giving his distinguished name to our third nuclear attack carrier. It was President Eisenhower who initiated nuclear-powered vessels, both surface and sub-surface."

Mr. Dwight David Eisenhower II, grandson of the late President, authenticated the keel. Mrs. Mamie Eisenhower witnessed the ceremony.

Also participating were Under Secretary of the Navy John W. Warner; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., Chief of Naval Operations; Vice Admiral H. G. Rickover, Director of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, and senior officials of the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co.

As principal speaker, Secretary Laird

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Appears On 'Issues And Answers'

Sec. Laird Discusses Military Assistance, Cambodia

More military assistance will be required for those nations that want to cooperate with the Nixon Doctrine of partnership, strength and a willingness to negotiate, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird said Aug. 16.

Appearing on ABC's "Issues and Answers" radio and television program, Mr. Laird noted that this includes the various areas of Asia," as we implement the Nixon Doctrine.

Secretary Laird also discussed results of the Cambodian operation.

Following are excerpts of the interview by ABC newsmen John Scali, State Department correspondent, and Roger Peterson, Pentagon correspondent.

MR. SCALI—Mr. Secretary, if we can move to Southeast Asia for a moment, it is a month and a half now since American troops were pulled out of Cambodia. Now that you have had more time to assess the results, what would you say are the clearly discernible gains? For example, can the Cambodian operation accelerate American troop withdrawals from Vietnam?

SECRETARY LAIRD—Well, I think there are three major pluses as far as the Cambodian operation is concerned. *First*, it has made it possible for us to reduce the level of American casualties in Southeast Asia. *Secondly*, it has insured the withdrawal of American troops in accordance with President Nixon's program to reduce American presence in that area of the world and, *third*—and I think this is indeed most important —I believe that it has caused the United States to be in a position where they can rely to a much greater extent on the forces of the South Vietnamese because these forces received a great shot in the arm from this, a great deal of self-confidence and they are now able to move forward and take over to a much greater extent than ever before the combat responsibilities, and as phase one of our Vietnamization program goes forward this degree of self-confidence for the South Vietnamese forces was most important.

MR. PETERSON—Mr. Secretary, as a result of the Cambodian operation some people are saying it has taken the pressure off the southern half of Vietnam. Some have gone as far as to say for all intents and purposes the war is over in III and IV Corps. Do you agree with that?

SECRETARY LAIRD—Well, it has reduced the pressure as far as the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong are concerned on III and IV Corps because the sanctuary areas can no longer be used for them to have the freedom of operation and freedom of movement which they had; not only as far as manpower is concerned, but also as far as supplies are concerned. This has been an improvement. It is important, however, during this period of time, to keep the pressure on the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong in Cambodia, and to keep the pressure on by the use of air power, and the reason that we are using air power to stop the buildup of supplies and manpower in that area is to minimize American casualties, because the casualties

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird

that are inflicted by the use of air power as far as Americans are concerned are almost zero.

Since I have been Secretary of Defense, every effort has been made to reduce American casualties in Vietnam. In the first two quarters of this year they are one-half of what they were last year. They are one-third of what they were two years ago and we will continue to keep that pressure on so that we can keep American combat casualties on the ground at a very low level. One casualty is a great deal, but we are trying to reduce these casualties and this is one of the important things that I think has been brought about by destroying the sanctuaries and by removing them from occupation by the North Vietnamese troops.

MR. SCALI—Mr. Secretary, would you favor a big military aid program for Cambodia to arm and equip the Lon Nol forces?

SECRETARY LAIRD—Well, I think we have to face up to the problem of implementing the Nixon Doctrine, not only in Southeast Asia, but throughout Asia, and the Nixon Doctrine will cost us less as far as our own military manpower, military equipment are concerned, and the dedication of troops to that area of the world, but it will cost us more in the form of military assistance, and in order to implement the Nixon Doctrine, we must give the air and sea support that is needed and necessary. But we must be willing to go forward with an

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Resources Conservation Program (RECON)

Secretary Laird Stresses Defense-wide Cost Conscious Campaign

(Continued From Page One)

to look back 20 years to find percentages as low," the Secretary stated.

The memorandum continued, "Appreciating the austere nature of our FY 1971 Defense budget and the great need to stretch our financial resources to a maximum to meet our mandatory requirements, it is incumbent on all in Defense to be cost conscious."

Secretary Laird explained:

—This means that good, money-saving ideas must get around—not remain anchored at homeport.

—It means that every person whose bright idea saves a dollar for Defense should receive the credit due him.

—It means setting fair, uncomplicated cost reduction goals that really motivate.

—It means keeping a straight record so that savings can be keyed into the budget—and doing it with less paperwork and fewer headaches.

DYNAMIC MANAGEMENT

He said the Resources Conservation Program "encourages that kind of dynamic management through every level of the Department of Defense."

In his memorandum, Secretary Laird said, "On June 30, 1971 I expect the record to show that this program has realized its potential in your organization."

He added, "Started right and backed by your strong continuing emphasis on its objectives, this program will produce the efficient, economic operations our budget ceilings demand."

OBJECTIVE: DoD's Resources Conservation Program

The objective of the RECON Program is to improve management and operating practices at all levels of the Department of Defense and to stimulate the initiation of positive management improvement actions which will ensure the achievement of requisite military capability at the most economic cost.

The DoD Instruction states that this objective will be achieved by:

• Establishing quantitative monetary goals for specifically identified areas, by DoD components, as appropriate.

• Reporting monetary benefits on a regular basis that accrue to DoD from qualifying actions.

• Encouraging personnel motivation by assigning a high priority to the implementation of the RECON program at all levels within the Department of Defense.

RECON Program Reporting System—The objectives of the Program's Reporting System are:

—To provide a system for identifying, documenting and reporting the benefits, quantified in terms of dollars, that result from new, improved or intensified management actions.

—To measure progress against the program objective.

Instruction 7720.6 states, "Benefits from management improvement actions taken in any functional area will be identified and reported if they contribute to the program objective and conform to RECON criteria."

PROCEDURES

DoD Instruction 7720.6 points out that the head of each military department and the Defense Supply Agency will establish procedures for developing and assigning annual goals to all appropriate organizational elements and activities within his Department/Agency.

RECOGNITION

The Secretary of Defense will accord special recognition annually to a limited number of DoD personnel and organizations whose contributions—considered collectively—best represent the total Defense-wide RECON effort.

In addition, the Instruction says, "DoD components should assure that each deserving individual participating in the RECON Program receives recognition commensurate with his contribution."

NEGRO PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMED FORCES

More than 292,000 Negroes were on active duty with the Armed Forces March 31, 1970, representing 9.5 per cent of the total U.S. Armed Forces strength.

Army recorded the highest Negro participation with a total of 150,748 or 11.4 per cent officers and enlisted men as of May 31, 1970.

Following is Negro participation in the Armed Forces (percentages are in parenthesis):

	OFFICER	ENLISTED	TOTAL
ARMY	5,379 (3.2)	145,369 (12.5)	150,748 (11.4)
NAVY	420 (0.5)	34,336 (5.5)	34,756 (4.9)
MARINE CORPS	308 (1.2)	30,684 (11.8)	30,992 (10.8)
AIR FORCE	2,267 (1.7)	73,950 (11.0)	76,217 (9.5)
TOTAL	8,374 (2.1)	284,339 (10.5)	292,713 (9.5)

The Navy's officer figure is a Department of Navy estimate.

The United Nations And United States In The 1970s

In an Aug. 6 appearance before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Secretary of State William P. Rogers explored the gains that the United Nations had made in the first 25 years of its existence and outlined the hopes that the Administration has for the growth of that organization's role in the coming decade. Here is the first of two parts of Secretary Rogers' statement.

I welcome this opportunity to appear before [this] subcommittee to discuss the United Nations. As you have stated, Mr. Chairman, its 25th Anniversary is an occasion "to ascertain where the U.N. fits in the over-all framework of U.S. foreign policy for the decade of the 1970s."

We all know that U.S. participation in the U.N. must be grounded on policies that protect our national interest and that are convincing to the Congress and to the American public if they are to be successful.

Peace Building Role

Last fall the President reaffirmed to the U.N. General Assembly our fundamental national interest in maintaining that "structure of international stability on which peace depends and which makes orderly progress possible." He urged the U.N. not only to pursue its efforts at peacekeeping but to concentrate as well on activities which contribute to peace building. For example he stressed protecting the environment, sharing the benefits of space technology, fostering economic development and population control, and securing the safety of international air travel.

As I have stated in previous Congressional appearances, this Administration will, to the extent feasible, look to multilateral institutions—and particularly to the U.N.—to deal with threats to security and to promote peaceful settlement of conflicts.

Though considerably short of our hopes, the U.N.'s accomplishments in keeping the peace are substantial, i.e., by turning back aggression in Korea, by preventing and containing violence in Cyprus, the Congo, Kashmir and over many years in the Middle East. In addition, the U.N. has successfully fostered arms control agreements, raised living standards in developing areas, drafted rules of law to regulate the behavior of nations in outer space and the oceans, and facilitated the orderly process of decolonization. Certainly in implementing the provisions of the Charter with respect to economic development, human rights and self-determination, there has been much more progress than might have been expected at the inception of the United Nations.

'Along with other nations, we are searching for measures to make the U.N. more responsive and effective. We are enlisting the talents and energies of leading citizens and experts in this exercise.'

Goals In The Future

Yet, with all of its achievements, the U.N. has fallen short of the world's hopes and needs. It must be acknowledged that with respect to problems of war and peace confidence in the U.N. has waned. Some of its difficulties are the aftermath of its early successes, particularly in speeding the transition to independence for hundreds of million of people in scores of new nations. Others are the result of unrealistic expectations that attended its creation.

This anniversary year is a time for stocktaking and we are undertaking a candid appraisal of the U.N.'s strengths and shortcomings. Along with other nations, we are searching for measures to make the U.N. more responsive and effective. We are enlisting the talents and energies of leading citizens and experts in this exercise. The President on July 9 appointed a Commission for the Observance of the 25th Anniversary, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge.

The Executive Order establishing the Commission provides that it is to undertake a searching reappraisal of the potential of the U.N. to promote international peace and stability in conditions of justice and progress, to consider measures to improve the effectiveness of the U.N. and of U.S. participation therein, and to recommend new proposals to assist the President in his determination of U.S. policy toward the U.N.

Without anticipating the recommendations the Commission may make, I should like to indicate very broadly four key areas

in which we believe that steps could be taken to make the U.N. a more effective instrument to meet changing world needs.

—First, there is a clear need to strengthen the U.N.'s capacity to deal with political crises, to take emergency peacekeeping action and to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Dim Financial Picture

The U.N. is not yet able to undertake peacekeeping operations in a systematic way, nor to finance them properly. The financial picture in particular is disturbing, in that no agreement has been reached on overcoming the U.N. deficit caused by the refusal of the Soviets and French to pay certain peacekeeping expenses in the early 1960s. We believe that every effort must be made to wipe out this deficit and we are pleased that the Secretary General has initiated discussions to that end.

Clearly there are limits to what can be expected of the U.N. in the field of peacekeeping, but we believe the time is ripe for a new effort to arrive at a more reliable understanding on ground rules and procedures for the conduct of peacekeeping operations. We have been discussing this matter directly with the Soviet Union and in a special U.N. committee. We are searching for an understanding whereby, without prejudice to the General Assembly's residual authority, the Security Council would authorize and define the mandate of peacekeeping operations and the Secretary General would implement the mandate in consultation with member governments most concerned.

One question at issue is the degree of flexibility to be left to the Secretary General to adapt operations to the circumstances of each case. We have stressed the need for flexibility in this regard since we do not think it practical to subject all operational decisions to the risk of a veto. I can report that our discussions with the Soviet Union on this subject have been businesslike and that they are continuing.

Forces For Peace

We believe that an agreement along these lines is the key to other steps needed to improve advance arrangements for making available observers, military contingents and logistical support when needed. Various proposals for standby forces and for more reliable financing have been advanced at your hearings, and in recent studies. We are studying these carefully and will look for opportunities to make progress on them.

We are also concerned with the peaceful settlement of disputes. This includes enhancing the capacity of the U.N. for alleviating tension, for conciliation, and for early warning of impending conflict. We are therefore making a special effort to revitalize provisions of the Charter relating to timely action by the General Assembly and the Security Council in recommending methods of adjustment of international disputes, and for engaging the Secretary General in their early stages.

'. . . We believe the time is ripe for a new effort to arrive at a more reliable understanding on ground rules and procedures for the conduct of peacekeeping operations.'

The involvement of the United Nations in the Arab-Israeli dispute illustrates both the Organization's strengths and weaknesses in keeping the peace and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes.

—The second area is in finding ways to strengthen the International Court of Justice. The Court did not have a single case on its docket until a week ago, and a revival of the Court's functions is long overdue. As I noted in an address to the American Society of International Law[1] last April, there are numerous ways in which the role of the Court might be enhanced. Among these are: greater use of Chambers of the Court, meetings of the Chambers outside The Hague; establishing regional Chambers, particularly in the developing world; and giving regional organizations access to the Court.

We are engaged in consultations with a number of governments to find a basis for appropriate action at the coming General Assembly on the role of the Court. The major problem, of course, is the failure of states to submit disputes to the Court. For our part we are examining various disputes to which we are a party to determine whether the Court might be brought into play. In this connection we were pleased to join in support of a Security Council resolution on July 29 requesting an advisory opinion from the Court on the legal consequences for states of the continued presence of South Africa in South West Africa. *(To Be Continued)*

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[1] Commanders Digest, May 30, 1970

Gives Firsthand Report

General Westmoreland Encouraged By Results In Republic Of Vietnam

General William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, recently returned from a two week visit to the Western Pacific —spending about half his time in the Republic of Vietnam.

Speaking at the 52nd annual convention of the National Exchange Club's American Citizenship dinner in Atlanta, Ga., General Westmoreland said, "I returned to South Vietnam after two years of absence following four and one-half years there. I can report to you that I was very encouraged by what I saw."

Following are excerpts from his address:

Behind the shield provided by United States and Free World troops, the Vietnamese Armed Forces have continued to improve. They have increased in numbers. Modern weapons have been provided them. Security has been expanded. As a result, approximately 90 per cent of the people are now living in relatively secure conditions and can lead an almost normal life. Roads that were once closed are now open; traffic is flowing. Recently upgraded roads have facilitated travel between hamlets and between villages. Particularly impressive to me was the additional land that is now under cultivation. By virtue of new strains of rice and other produce that we have provided to the South Vietnamese, the peasant is growing more rice and other products for sale than ever before. And because of the security situation he can get crops to the market place.

Additional Confidence

I would say the most significant thing I noticed was the additional confidence in the South Vietnamese leadership—from President Thieu, down through the ranks of the civil government and the military organization.

The operations into Cambodia had a pronounced effect. They reduced enemy military pressure on the southern part of the country. The enemy's logistic bases have been disrupted and in many cases destroyed. The South Vietnamese operated in Cambodia without benefit of American advisers. On their own for the first time, they performed quite well. I believe that they can continue to expand security, apply pressure on the Communist insurgents, and meet the invading North Vietnamese forces despite the fact that we will be withdrawing 150,000 troops between now and May 1 (1971).

This progress has been possible because of the shield of security that we provided, plus, ironically, the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968. . . .

Where the enemy exposes himself, we are in a position to inflict greater casualties on him more rapidly. Such was the case in Vietnam at the time of the enemy's massive attack in late January 1968. The Communists have not yet recovered from the tremendous casualties, particularly in small unit leadership, that they suffered at that time.

This Tet offensive, however, was even more important to the South Vietnamese. It was like our Pearl Harbor to them. War came to their cities. It shocked them. It served to unify the people and galvanized the government to the point that general mobilization was politically acceptable to the people. By virtue of this government action, which was fully acceptable to the people after the shock of the Tet offensive, the Armed Forces have now expanded to 1,100,000 men. The Tet offensive, although a psychological shock to the American people as reported in the newspapers and viewed on the television screens,

'The situation in South Vietnam is no longer fragile. I believe the South Vietnamese are strong enough to stand the stresses of the near future. Beyond the near future, the problem is one of staying power for the South Vietnamese.'

motivated the South Vietnamese to greater action than they had displayed before.

Having given this optimistic report on my observations in Vietnam, I must balance the picture so that you will not conclude that all is favorable.

Many problems are still to be solved. The underground Communist government—the so-called shadow government or political infrastructure—still exists among the people. This has not been fully ferreted out and more remains to be done by the South Vietnamese. But the enemy within the ranks of the people has now became more a nuisance than a threat to the government. Inflation, also a problem, has had an adverse effect on soldiers and their families and civil servants. If this problem is not solved, morale will suffer. President Thieu told me and certain members of the U.S. Mission that the South Vietnamese believe they are on top of the problem, that they can solve the short-term economic difficulties that now plague South Vietnam. The long-range economic picture, on the other hand, seems to be bright indeed.

Although other deficiencies exist, the South Vietnamese and our commanders on the scene are aware of them. I can assure you that they are doing everything possible to sustain our progress. Maintaining our withdrawal of troops and turning the security of South Vietnam back to the South Vietnamese depend on our continued momentum.

President Nixon has announced that he will make his decisions periodically based on how well the South Vietnamese are prepared to take over their burden, whether progress is evident in the Paris negotiations, and what the enemy does on the battlefield.

At the present time enemy action is scattered in the southern part of the country because of the success of our Cambodian operations. But the enemy still poses a threat in the area to the north with his troops in Laos and in the western reaches of the northern part of South Vietnam.

As I see it, the situation in South Vietnam is no longer fragile. I believe the South Vietnamese are strong enough to stand the stresses of the near future. Beyond the near future, the problem is one of staying power for the South Vietnamese.

Appears On 'Issues And Answers'

Sec. Laird Discusses Military Assistance, Cambodia

(Continued From Page Two)

enlarged commitment as far as military assistance is concerned.

This isn't only true in Southeast Asia; this is true in Korea as well.

MR. SCALI—This means specifically a new military aid program for Cambodia?

SECRETARY LAIRD—I would assume that military assistance to those nations of the world that want to cooperate with the Nixon Doctrine of partnership, strength and a willingness to negotiate, will require more military assistance. I don't want to limit it, however . . .

MR. SCALI—This includes Thailand too, for example?

SECRETARY LAIRD—This includes the various areas of Asia, as we implement the Nixon Doctrine.

As we remove our troops from Korea, I think it should be understood that we will save money as far as the Defense budget is concerned, and there will be substantial savings, but we must increase our military assistance program so the Korean forces in South Korea can be modernized and I think it is important for us to put this right out on the table so all Americans understand. True, we will have less U.S. Defense costs, but there will be greater costs in the military assistance area. But it will give us the opportunity to reduce the American manpower presence in Asia as long as we go foward with this kind of military assistance program.

MR. PETERSON—Mr. Secretary, does the Nixon Doctrine allow for hiring mercenaries? Aren't we in effect, if we were giving aid to Thailand—Thailand is training ethnic Cambodians who happen to live in Thailand to go in to Cambodia and fight the North Vietnamese—giving them money in order for them to do it? Are we just hiring people and sending them in?

SECRETARY LAIRD—I suppose you could interpret a military assistance program along that line. I don't interpret it that way. I believe that the military assistance programs can be substantiated on the basis of the reduction of American casualties, the reduction of American costs, the reduction of the presence of American manpower, and I think it is much better for us to take this approach than the approach that has been taken in the past; and that is to commit large forces on the ground in Asia and I think that is the choice that we have. I would rather take the military assistance route, coupled with the importance of implementing the Nixon Doctrine in Asia as the route that we should follow in the decade of the 1970s.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

Published weekly by American Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va. 22209, a unified activity of the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, OASD (M&RA). Reproduction of content is authorized. Suggested dateline for materials used is WASHINGTON (AFPS).

VISITS ROTC SUMMER TRAINING—Lieutenant General Frederick C. Weyand, Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, concentrates on cadet map reading progress during a recent visit to ROTC summer training at Ft. Riley, Kan. General Weyand was commissioned through the ROTC program at the University of California in 1939. Approximately 15,000 advanced Army ROTC cadets from more than 250 colleges and universities attended summer camps at five Army installations this summer.

MR. SCALI—Mr. Secretary, to move on to another area, the Pentagon has been taking a pretty tough beating this week for its plans to dump nerve gas into the Atlantic Ocean. A couple of quick questions:

Will you do this again or (b) will you find other devices such as detoxifying future obsolete gas?

SECRETARY LAIRD—This Administration, under the leadership of President Nixon, made the first study of biological warfare and biological research, as well as chemical warfare that had been made since 1958. We have changed the direction in this country as far as our program is concerned in the chemical warfare area. These particular vaults that we had to get rid of, that procedure is not being followed any longer by the Army. These particular shells were put in these concrete vaults starting back in about '67 and 1968. We now have a program in which we detoxify these weapons in an entirely different way. It will not happen again, but this, along with some of the other problems that we inherited, I believe, is the only way for the safety and security of our country to proceed.

Attack Carrier Is An Important Element Of American Sea Power

(Continued From Page One)

said, "If our nation is to protect its citizens and their vital interests—if it is to assume any responsibility for international peace and security—it cannot allow its naval forces to deteriorate.

'The freedom of the ocean sea lands, and the air lanes over the seas, must be maintained.'

"The freedom of the ocean sea lanes, and the air lanes over the seas, must be maintained.

"The attack carrier has been the backbone of our sea power during the past three turbulent decades. We have seen its effectiveness in combat in the Pacific in the 1940s, in Korea in the 1950s, and in Vietnam in the 1960s. In time of crisis, it helped to keep the peace off the shores of Lebanon and in the Taiwan Straits. Its presence in the Mediterranean today is reassuring to our NATO allies as well as to all who seek to restore peace and stability in the Mid-East. . . .

"As the number of land bases available to our aircraft decreases, we shall need this mobile air base—a base capable of bringing air power to bear wherever it may be needed and ready to respond at all times. We shall need this defense against anti-ship missiles, capable of sinking guided missile ships and destroying missile-launching aircraft before they are within range of their targets. . . .

'Our nation's great objective is the attainment of a secure peace for coming generations of Americans. To that objective, we dedicate the USS Eisenhower.'

"Our nation's great objective is the attainment of a secure peace for coming generations of Americans. To that objective, we dedicate the USS Eisenhower."

Completion of the USS Eisenhower is expected to take about five years.

The first nuclear carrier, Enterprise, has been in operation since 1961 and has completed four combat deployments in the Vietnam conflict. Eisenhower is the second of three carriers planned of the Nimitz class.

Funds for procurement of long lead-time items for the third carrier of the Nimitz class, the CVAN-70, are included in the Fiscal Year 1971 budget request now before the Congress.

USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
CVAN - 69
NUCLEAR-POWERED ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIER
KEEL LAID AUGUST 15, 1970
AT
NEWPORT NEWS SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK COMPANY
AUTHENTICATED BY
DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER, II
"UNTIL WAR IS ELIMINATED FROM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNPREPAREDNESS FOR IT IS WELL NIGH AS CRIMINAL AS WAR ITSELF."
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
34TH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Artist concept of nuclear-powered attack carrier USS Eisenhower.

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

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